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Abstract
Various assumptions on a right-censoring mechanism to ensure
consistency of the Kaplan–Meier and Aalen–Johansen estimators in
a competing risks setting are studied. Specifically, eight different as-
sumptions are seen to fall in two categories: a weaker identifiability
assumption, which is the weakest possible assumption in a precise
sense, and a stronger representativity assumption which ensures the
existence of an independent censoring time. When a given censoring
time is considered, similar assumptions can be made on the censoring
time. This allows for a characterization of so-called pointwise inde-
pendence as well as full independence of censoring time and event time
and type. Examples illustrate how the various assumptions differ.
Keywords: Censoring; competing risks; consistency; identifiability;
product integral; representativity.
1 Introduction
When dealing with right censoring in survival analysis, assumptions on the
censoring mechanism are inevitably needed in order to bridge the gap be-
tween the observable world and the underlying world of interest. Many seem-
ingly different assumptions have been proposed in the literature. The papers
of Williams & Lagakos (1977), Kalbfleisch & MacKay (1979), and Lagakos
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(1979) did clarify connections between some of the different assumptions.
Since then, martingale theory has become a much used tool in survival anal-
ysis, and assumptions on the censoring mechanism are made by means of mar-
tingale assumptions in, for instance, Aalen & Johansen (1978), Gill (1980),
and Andersen et al. (1993). A clear overview and comparison of the various
assumptions does, however, seem to be lacking.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a clear overview and a comparison
of various assumptions on the censoring mechanism made in order to ensure
consistency of estimators such as the Kaplan–Meier and Aalen–Johansen
estimators. This is done in a competing risks setting and without assuming
absolute continuity of the involved random variables. Along the way, we
obtain assumptions that are minimal in a precise sense for ensuring this
consistency. We also make clear that important differences exist between
considering a given, underlying censoring time producing right censoring and
not considering such a censoring time.
Additionally, the use of product integrals and the techniques used in the
many proofs might, in itself, be of interest to researchers in the field of
theoretical survival analysis. In particular, the appendix provides a wealth
of technical results that may be useful in other settings as well.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, right censoring in a
general form is studied and minimal conditions to ensure consistency of
the Kaplan–Meier and Aalen–Johansen estimators are obtained. Various
assumptions from the literature are discussed and it is shown that they only
correspond to two nested properties: an identifiability assumption and a rep-
resentativity assumption – the latter being the strongest. Section 3 concerns
the setting where an explicit censoring time is given. We discuss assump-
tions on the censoring mechanism and show that independence of the event
and censoring times is equivalent to representativity assumptions on both
the event and censoring time. In Section 4 we treat two examples in order to
show that the representativity assumption is strictly stronger than the iden-
tifiability assumption and to illustrate the assumptions in a practical setting.
Finally, in Section 5 we discuss some of the perspectives of the paper.
2 A censored event time
Consider an event time T > 0 and event type D ∈ {1, . . . , d} that are subject
to right censoring meaning that we are only able to observe a T˜ > 0 with
T˜ ≤ T and an indicator D˜ = D1(T˜ = T ) with values in {0, . . . , d} where
0 indicates a censoring. These are all considered proper random variables,
that is, with P(T˜ < ∞) = P(T < ∞) = 1. We will refer to T˜ and D˜ as
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the observed exit time and exit type, respectively, because the risk set is
exited at time T˜ and D˜ states how. This setting does not involve an explicit,
underlying censoring time and may be useful in certain practical settings
where such a censoring time is difficult to define. A setting with a given
censoring time is dealt with in the next section.
For the pair (T,D) of interest we define the survival function S(t) =
P(T > t), the cause-specific cumulative incidence functions Fj(t) = P(T ≤
t, D = j) for j = 1, . . . , d and the cause-specific cumulative hazard functions
Hj(t) =
∫ t
0 S(s−)
−1Fj(ds) for j = 1, . . . , d. We define the corresponding
functions for the observed pair (T˜ , D˜), that is, S˜(t) = P(T˜ > t), F˜j(t) =
P(T˜ ≤ t, D˜ = j) and H˜j(t) =
∫ t
0 S˜(s−)
−1F˜j(ds) for j = 0, . . . , d. Both Hj
and H˜j are well-defined functions from [0,∞) into [0,∞] for j = 1, . . . , d.
Here and in the following, division by 0 can be interpreted as 0 or any arbi-
trary number since it only occurs in integrals on a null set of the integrator.
Frequently, a restriction to the interval J = {t ∈ [0,∞) | S˜(t) > 0} is
relevant since we will never observe an exit time beyond J . Let τ denote
sup{t > 0 : S˜(t) > 0} and note that either J = [0, τ), when S˜(τ−) = 0, or
J = [0, τ ], when S˜(τ−) > 0.
In this section we shall study the assumptions under which we can identify
S and Fj by the Kaplan–Meier and Aalen–Johansen estimators defined in
Appendix 2. To this end, let P denote the (d + 1) × (d + 1) matrix of
transition probabilities
P(s, t) =


S(t | s) F1(t | s) · · · Fd(t | s)
0 1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
0 0 · · · 1


where S(t | s) = P(T > t | T > s) = S(t)/S(s) and Fj(t | s) = P(T ≤
t, D = j | T > s) = (Fj(t) − Fj(s))/S(s) for j = 1, . . . , d and t ≥ s. With a
slight abuse of notation, we let P(t) = P(0, t) which is the matrix of interest.
If H(t) =
∑d
j=1 Hj(t) denotes the all-cause cumulative hazard function and
H˜(t) =
∑d
j=1 H˜j(t) denotes the observed counterpart, then we define the two
(d+ 1)× (d+ 1) matrices
H(t) =


−H(t) H1(t) · · · Hd(t)
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0

 , H˜(t) =


−H˜(t) H˜1(t) · · · H˜d(t)
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0


(1)
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and again, with slight abuse of notation, we let H(s, t) = H(t) −H(s) and
H˜(s, t) = H˜(t)− H˜(s) for t ≥ s.
According to (14) of the appendix, the Aalen–Johansen estimator Pˆn(t),
defined in (13) of the appendix, is consistent for Pt0(I+H˜(ds)) for any t ∈ J
in a setting with independent and identically distributed observations. We
now have the following result.
Proposition 1. In a setting with n independent and identically distributed
observations, the Aalen–Johansen estimator Pˆn(t) consistently estimates P(t)
for all t ∈ J if and only if H˜(t) = H(t) for all t ∈ J . In other words, the
Aalen–Johansen estimator of Fj(t) is consistent for all t ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d
if and only if H˜j(t) = Hj(t) for all t ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d.
Proof. By uniqueness of the product integral, we immediately have H(t) =
H˜(t) for all t ∈ J if and only if Pt0(I + H(ds)) = Pt0(I + H˜(ds)) for all
t ∈ J . This is due to Theorem 3 of Gill & Johansen (1990) since both H
and H˜ are seen to be of bounded variation on [0, t] for any t ∈ J . Now, P
is seen to satisfy the requirements of Lemma 8 of the appendix by definition
of Hj from which it follows that P(t) = Pt0(I+H(ds)). This establishes the
equivalence.
A similar argument reveals that the Kaplan–Meier estimator Sˆn(t) from
(15) in the appendix consistently estimates S(t) for all t ∈ J if and only if
H˜(t) = H(t) for all t ∈ J .
We call the property of Proposition 1 the property of identity of forces of
mortality with inspiration from Elandt-Johnson (1976). An assumption of
identity of forces of mortality is, for instance, used by Gail (1975) in a com-
peting risks setting as a weaker substitute for the assumption of independent
latent event times.
Williams & Lagakos (1977) study, in a setting without competing risks,
the constant-sum assumption as a weaker alternative to the assumption of
independence of event time and censoring time. Let aj be the function,
unique up to Fj-null sets, given by aj(t) = P(T˜ = t, D˜ = j |T = t, D = j) and
let B(t) =
∫ t−
0 S(s)
−1F˜0(ds). In the competing risks setting, the constant-
sum property can then be phrased as
aj(t) +B(t) = 1
for Fj-almost all t ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d. In the paper of Kalbfleisch & MacKay
(1979), the authors argue that this property is equivalent to identity of forces
of mortality in a setting without competing risks and with a differentiable
event hazard function.
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Estimators in survival analysis and in the competing risks setting have
often been studied using martingale theory, for instance in Aalen & Johansen
(1978), Gill (1980), Jacobsen (1989), and Andersen et al. (1993). In such
a setting, the following martingale property, which we will call the weak
martingale property in light of stronger properties introduced later on, has
been shown to ensure the desired consistency of estimators. Let N˜j(t) =
1(T˜ ≤ t, D˜ = j) for j = 0, . . . , d and Y˜ (t) = 1(T˜ ≥ t). The weak martingale
property is that the processes given by
N˜j(t)−
∫ t
0
Y˜ (s)Hj(ds),
for t ≥ 0, for j = 1, . . . , d are all martingales with respect to the filtration
given by F˜t = σ(N˜j(s) : j ∈ {0, . . . , d}, s ≤ t), which models the observed
information. This or similar assumptions are made, for instance, in Assump-
tion 3.1.1 of Gill (1980), in (2.9) of Jacobsen (1989), in Definition 3.1.1 of
Martinussen & Scheike (2007), in (5.5) of Kalbfleisch & Prentice (1980), and
in Theorem 1.3.1 of Fleming & Harrington (1991).
Recall that aj(t) = P(T˜ = t, D˜ = j | T = t, D = j). We consider here
yet another property, which we call status-independent observation. Status-
independent observation is the property that
aj(t) = P(T˜ ≥ t | T ≥ t)
for Fj-almost all t ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d, and it is called so because it states
that between the statuses of surviving up to a certain time, T ≥ t, and having
some event at that time, T = t with D = j, the probability, given a certain
status, of that status actually being observed does not depend on the status.
As the following result shows, these four properties are in fact equivalent,
and we will refer them collectively as the identifiability property in light of
Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. The following properties are equivalent.
(2.1) Identity of forces of mortality: H˜j(t) = Hj(t) for j = 1, . . . , d and for
any t ∈ J .
(2.2) The weak martingale property: The processes given by N˜j(t)−
∫ t
0 Y˜ (s)Hj(ds),
t ≥ 0, for j = 1, . . . , d are all martingales with respect to the filtration
(F˜t), the observed information.
(2.3) Status-independent observation: aj(t) = P(T˜ ≥ t |T ≥ t) for Fj-almost
all t ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d.
5
(2.4) The constant-sum property: aj(t) + B(t) = 1 for Fj-almost all t ∈ J
for j = 1, . . . , d.
Proof. We consider it well known that N˜j(t)−
∫ t
0 Y˜ (s)H˜j(ds), t ≥ 0 defines
a martingale with respect to (F˜t). Under the assumption of (2.1) and since
Y˜ is 0 and there is no increment in N˜j outside J almost surely, we have that
N˜j(t)−
∫ t
0
Y˜ (s)Hj(ds) =
∫
(0,t]∩J
(N˜j(ds)− Y˜ (s)Hj(ds))
=
∫
(0,t]∩J
(N˜j(ds)− Y˜ (s)H˜j(ds)) = N˜j(t)−
∫ t
0
Y˜ (s)H˜j(ds),
almost surely for all t ≥ 0 which yields the result. On the other hand, assume
that (2.2) holds. Then, for a given j ∈ {1, . . . , d} and a given t ∈ J ,
F˜j(t) = E(N˜j(t)) =
∫ t
0
E(Y˜ (s))Hj(ds) =
∫ t
0
S˜(s−)Hj(ds).
Since S˜(s−) > 0 for s ≤ t, integrating S˜(s−)−1 with respect to both sides
establishes
Hj(t) =
∫ t
0
1
S˜(s−)
F˜j(ds) = H˜j(t)
and this yields (2.1).
Generally, F˜j(t) =
∫ t
0 aj(s)Fj(ds) and S˜(s−) = P(T˜ ≥ s | T ≥ s)S(s−).
For t ∈ J , this establishes
H˜j(t) =
∫ t
0
aj(s)
P(T˜ ≥ s | T ≥ s)
1
S(s−)
Fj(ds)
=
∫ t
0
aj(s)
P(T˜ ≥ s | T ≥ s)
Hj(ds)
and thereby the equivalence of (2.1) and (2.3), since Hj and Fj have the
same null sets on J . Assume that (2.1) and (2.3) hold. By using equation
(6) of the appendix, it can be seen that B(t) = P(T˜ < t | T ≥ t) for all
t ∈ J under this assumption. Since P(T˜ ≥ t | T ≥ t) = aj(t) for Fj-
almost all t ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d under the assumption, we have established
aj(t) + B(t) = 1 for Fj-almost all t ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d, which is (2.4).
Assume instead that (2.4) holds. Equation (8) of the appendix implies that,
again, B(t) = P(T˜ < t | T ≥ t) for all t ∈ J . Use of the constant-sum
condition again then yields aj(t) = P(T˜ ≥ t | T ≥ t) for Fj-almost all t ∈ J
for j = 1, . . . , d, which is (2.3).
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A somewhat stronger martingale property has, however, also been con-
sidered. Let Nj(t) = 1(T ≤ t, D = j) for j = 1, . . . , d and Y (t) = 1(T ≥ t).
Define also a filtration by Ft = σ(Nj(s) : j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, s ≤ t) and an en-
larged filtration by Gt = Ft
∨
F˜t. What we call the strong martingale property
is that the processes given by
Nj(t)−
∫ t
0
Y (s)Hj(ds),
for t ≥ 0, for j = 1, . . . , d are all martingales with respect to the enlarged
filtration (Gt). It seems well-known that the processes are martingales with
respect to (Ft). So, loosely speaking, the property states that enlarging the
filtration by (F˜t) does not add any information relevant for the processes.
This property has similarities to Definition III.2.1 of Andersen et al. (1993)
of an independent right censoring concept, which also requires the underlying
martingale processes to be martingales with respect to an enlarged filtration.
Similarly, Aalen & Johansen (1978) also require the underlying martingale
processes to be martingales with respect to an enlarged filtration.
The property that
P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s) = P(T ≤ t, D = j | T > s)
for all t ≥ 0, s ∈ J and j = 1, . . . , d plays a role in Theorem 3.1.1 of Gill
(1980), in condition (G) of Jacobsen (1989), and also matches the interpreta-
tion of independent right censoring given by Andersen & Keiding (2006), p.
466. We call this the property of non-prognostic observation since it implies
that, given survival past time s, the extra knowledge that the survival past s
is observed, T˜ > s, does not influence the prognosis, that is, the probability
of having events at a later point in time.
In Williams & Lagakos (1977), survival is said to be independent of the
conditions producing censoring when a property like
P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ = s, D˜ = 0) = P(T ≤ t, D = j | T > s)
for any t ≥ 0 and H˜0-almost all s ∈ J holds for j = 1, . . . , d. With inspira-
tion from Lagakos (1979), we will call this property non-prognostic censoring
because, under assumption of this property, the censoring does not provide
any prognostic information about the event time or type other than survival
to the censoring time.
The following result shows that these three properties are equivalent and,
moreover, that they are equivalent to the existence of an independent censor-
ing time. We will refer to them collectively as the representativity property
because, looking at (3.2) and (3.3), this property implies that those at risk
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at a given time, T˜ > s, are representative for those being censored at this
time, T˜ = s, D˜ = 0, in terms of the event risks.
Proposition 3. The following properties are equivalent.
(3.1) The strong martingale property: The processes that are given by Nj(t)−∫ t
0 Y (s)Hj(ds), t ≥ 0, for j = 1, . . . , d, are martingales with respect to
the enlarged filtration (Gt).
(3.2) Non-prognostic observation: P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s) = P(T ≤ t, D =
j | T > s) for all t ≥ 0 and s ∈ J .
(3.3) Non-prognostic censoring: P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ = s, D˜ = 0) = P(T ≤
t, D = j |T > s) for all t ≥ 0 and F˜0-almost all s ∈ J and j = 1, . . . , d.
(3.4) Existence of an independent censoring time: A censoring time, C > 0,
exists such that T˜ = T ∧ C and C ⊥ (T,D).
Proof. Assume (3.1) and let s ∈ J and t > s be given. Since {T˜ > s} ∈ Gs,
we can use the martingale property to obtain E(1(T ∈ (s, t], D = j, T˜ >
s)) = E(
∫ t
s 1(T ≥ u, T˜ > s)Hj(du)) and divide by P(T˜ > s) to get
P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s) =
∫ t
s
P(T ≥ u | T˜ > s)Hj(du). (2)
The (d + 1) × (d + 1) matrix-valued function given by B(s, t) = {βij(s, t)},
β1,j+1(s, t) = P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s) for j = 1, . . . , d, β1,1(s, t) = 1 −∑d
j=1 β1,j+1(s, t) = P(T > t|T˜ > s), and βi,j(s, t) = 1(i = j) for i = 2, . . . , d+
1 and j = 1, . . . , d + 1, is right continuous with left limits in both variables
and by (2) is seen to satisfy the conditions of Lemma 8. Thus, we conclude
that B(s, t) = Pts(I+H(du)), which then implies that B(s, t) = P(s, t) since
P(s, t) = Pts(I+H(du)) as seen earlier. In particular we have P(T ≤ t, D =
j | T˜ > s) = P(T ≤ t, D = j |T > s) for all t ∈ [s,∞)∩{u : S(u) > 0} by this
argument, and this extends to all t ≥ 0 since {T /∈ [s,∞) ∩ {u : S(u) > 0}}
has probability 0 in either probability measure. We have thereby established
(3.2).
Assuming (3.2), we may argue the other way to obtain, for u ≤ s ≤ t,
E(1(T ∈ (s, t], D = j, T˜ > u)) = E(
∫ t
s
1(T ≥ v, T˜ > u)Hj(dv)),
which is enough to establish the martingale property of (3.1) since Gt is
generated by sets of the type {T > t, T˜ > s} for s ≤ t and {T ≤ s,D =
j, T˜ > u} for s, u ≤ t.
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Assume again (3.2). Then we have the strong martingale property, (3.1),
which is seen to imply (2.2) since integration of the (Gt)-predictable process
t 7→ 1(T˜ ≥ t) with respect to the integrator t 7→ Nj(t)−
∫ t
0 Y (s)Hj(ds) yields
t 7→ N˜j(t)−
∫ t
0 Y˜ (s)Hj(ds), which is then a (Gt)-martingale and thus also a
(F˜t)-martingale. In light of Proposition 2 this means that (2.1) holds. For
any given t ≥ 0 and j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, equation (10) of the appendix reveals that∫∞
s (P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ = u, D˜ = 0)−P(T ≤ t, D = j |T > u))F˜0(du) = 0 for
any s ≥ 0 since the integrand is 0 for u > t, since we are assuming (3.2), and
since the first two integrals of (10) are always zero because for u ≥ 0 either
H˜j(u) = Hj(u) for all j = 1, . . . , d or S˜(u−) = 0. This establishes (3.3).
If we instead assume (3.3), we obtain (2.4) from equation (11) of the
appendix and so (2.1) from Proposition 2. Then equation (10) of the ap-
pendix shows that (3.2) holds since, again, for u ≥ 0 either H˜j(u) = Hj(u)
for j = 1, . . . , d or S˜(u−) = 0.
Assume now that (3.2) holds and let us show (3.4). The construction used
is the one given in Appendix 3 and is based on the modification Hˇ0 of H˜0
as defined in equation (3) below. By construction we have that T˜ = T ∧ C.
Furthermore, we see how, for t ≤ s with t ∈ J ,
P(T ≤ t, D = j, C > s) = P(T˜ ≤ t, D˜ = j, C > s)
=
s
R
0
(1− Hˇ0(du))
∫ t
0
u−
R
0
(1− H˜(dv))H˜j(du)
= P(C > s) P(T ≤ t, D = j)
according to equations (16) and (17) of the appendix since also (2.1) holds.
The conclusion, P(T ≤ t, D = j, C > s) = P(C > s) P(T ≤ t, D = j)
remains valid for t ≤ s when t ∈ (0,∞)\J and so s ∈ (0,∞)\J since in this
case either P(C > s) = 0 or P(T ≤ t, D = j) = P(T ∈ (0, t] ∩ J , D = j)
because P(C ∧ T ∈ J ) = 1. For t > s with s ∈ J , we have
P(T ∈ (s, t], D = j, C > s) = P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s) P(T˜ > s)
= P(T ≤ t, D = j | T > s) P(T˜ > s)
=
∫ t
s
u−
R
s
(1−H(dv))Hj(du)
s
R
0
(1− (H˜ + H˜0)(du)
=
∫ t
s
u−
R
0
(1−H(dv))Hj(du)
s
R
0
(1− Hˇ0(du))
= P(T ∈ (s, t], D = j) P(C > s),
using among other things (3.2) and the product structure of (4) below. The
conclusion P(T ∈ (s, t], D = j, C > s) = P(T ∈ (s, t], D = j) P(C > s)
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remains valid when s ∈ (0,∞)\J since either side is 0 in this case. Put
together, this establishes independence of C and (T,D) and so (3.4).
Under assumption of (3.4) we have P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s) = P(T ≤
t, D = j | T > s, C > s) = P(T ≤ t, D = j | T > s), using the independence,
and this is (3.2).
As noted by many authors working under assumption of some version
of the representativity property, representativity implies identifiability. As
demonstrated by Williams & Lagakos (1977) in their setting, the two prop-
erties are not equivalent. This is also the case in our setting.
Proposition 4. The representativity property implies the identifiability prop-
erty, but the reverse does not hold.
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 3, the implication has already been estab-
lished. Let us here present another argument. Assume (3.4) and choose a
censoring time C accordingly such that C ⊥ (T,D). Then (2.3) holds since
aj(t) = P(C ≥ t) = P(T˜ ≥ t | T ≥ t) for Fj almost all t ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d.
This shows the implication.
On the other hand, the event time T2 and the observed pair (T˜ , D˜) con-
structed in Section 4 below provides an example where identifiability holds
but representativity does not.
3 Censoring by a given censoring time
In this section we consider as given an event time T , an event type D, and
a censoring time C. The observed pair is thus explicitly T˜ = T ∧ C and
D˜ = D1(T ≤ C), which is a special case of the setting in Section 2.
For the censoring time, we denote its survival function K(t) = P(C >
t), distribution function G(t) = P(C ≤ t) and cumulative hazard function
H0(t) =
∫ t
0 K(s−)
−1G(ds).
As a result of the asymmetry between T and C in the definition of (T˜ , D˜)
where T takes priority, a modification of H˜0 is relevant for it to be comparable
to the defined H0. We let
Hˇ0(t) =
∫ t
0
1
1−∆H˜(s)
H˜0(ds) (3)
define this modification and note that ∆Hˇ0(t)(1 − ∆H˜(t)) = ∆H˜0(t) and
so (1 −∆Hˇ0(t))(1 −∆H˜(t)) = 1 −∆(H˜0 + H˜)(t). The continuous parts of
Hˇ0 and H˜0 are the same so by the characterization of the product integral
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S˜(t) = Pt0(1 − (H˜0 + H˜)(ds)) of Definition 4 from Gill & Johansen (1990),
the modification allows for the product structure
S˜(t) =
t
R
0
(1− H˜(ds))
t
R
0
(1− Hˇ0(ds)) (4)
which has technical importance in the following.
If we define Sˇ(t) = S˜(t−)(1−∆H˜(t)) = Pt0(1− H˜(ds))Pt−0 (1− Hˇ0(ds)),
this modification can also be expressed as Hˇ0(t) =
∫ t
0 Sˇ(s)
−1F˜0(ds) using
the definition of H˜0. The difference Sˇ(t)− S˜(t) is seen to be Sˇ(t)∆Hˇ0(t) =
∆F˜0(t) = P(T˜ = t, D˜ = 0), and, by letting Yˇ (t) = 1(T˜ > t) + 1(T˜ = t, D˜ =
0), we see that Sˇ(t) = E(Yˇ (t)) = P(T > t, C ≥ t).
We now consider properties relating to the censoring similar to those of
Proposition 2 which are then naturally termed the censoring identifiability
property.
Proposition 5. The following properties are equivalent.
(5.1) We have that Hˇ0(t) = H0(t) for any t ∈ J .
(5.2) The process given by N˜0(t)−
∫ t
0 Yˇ (s)H0(ds), t ≥ 0, is a martingale with
respect to the filtration (F˜t), the observed information.
(5.3) We have that P(T˜ = t, D˜ = 0 | C = t) = P(T > t | C ≥ t) for G-almost
all t ∈ J .
(5.4) We have that P(T˜ = t, D˜ = 0 | C = t) +
∑d
j=1
∫ t
0 K(s−)
−1F˜j(ds) = 1
for G-almost all t ∈ J .
Proof. The equivalence of (5.1) and (5.2) follows by a similar argument as in
the proof of Proposition 2 but now using the fact that N˜0(t)−
∫ t
0 Yˇ (s)Hˇ0(ds),
t ≥ 0, can be shown to define a martingale.
The equivalence of (5.1) and (5.3) is obtained by mimicking the steps in
Proposition 2 while using the identity
Hˇ0(t) =
∫ t
0
P(T˜ = s, D˜ = 0 | C = s)
Sˇ(s)/K(s−)
H0(ds).
The equivalence then follows by noting that Sˇ(s)/K(s−) = P(T > t |C ≥ t).
The identity in (7) of the appendix immediately shows that (5.1) implies
(5.4) by exploiting the fact that we have already established the equivalence
between (5.3) and (5.1). Similarly, the identity in (9) of the appendix imme-
diately shows that (5.4) implies (5.3).
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Williams & Lagakos (1977) considered, with inspiration from Gail (1975),
an independent censoring assumption which, in this setting, may be formu-
lated as the following property. The property is
F˜j(t) =
∫ t
0
K(s−)Fj(ds)
for j = 1, . . . , d and
F˜0(t) =
∫ t
0
S(s)G(ds)
for all t ∈ J . In Williams & Lagakos (1977), this assumption was seen to be
a stronger assumption than the constant-sum property, here given in (2.4).
As was also noted by Kalbfleisch & MacKay (1979), in the setting of their
paper, this is the case only because it includes an additional requirement on
the given censoring time. This is the content of the following result.
Proposition 6. The following properties are equivalent.
(6.1) H˜j(t) = Hj(t) for j = 1, . . . , d and Hˇ0(t) = H0(t) for all t ∈ J .
(6.2) F˜j(t) =
∫ t
0 K(s−)Fj(ds) for j = 1, . . . , d and F˜0(t) =
∫ t
0 S(s)G(ds) for
all t ∈ J .
(6.3) P(C ≥ t | T = t, D = j) = P(C ≥ t) for Fj-almost all t ∈ J for
j = 1, . . . , d and P(T > t | C = t) = P(T > t) for G-almost all t ∈ J .
Proof. Assume that (6.1) holds. The product structure S˜(t) = Pt0(1 −
H˜(ds))Pt0(1 − Hˇ0(ds)) results in S˜(t) = S(t)K(t) and similarly Sˇ(t) =
S(t)K(t−) under the assumption. Using the assumption again, we have
F˜j(t) =
∫ t
0 S˜(s−)Hj(ds) =
∫ t
0 K(s−)Fj(ds) and F˜0(t) =
∫ t
0 Sˇ(s)H0(ds) =∫ t
0 S(s)G(ds) which is (6.2).
Assume now that (6.2) holds. Then B(t) =
∫ t−
0 S(s)
−1F˜0(ds) = G(t−) =
1−K(t−) using the last part of the assumption. Using this in combination
with the first part of the assumption yields F˜j(t) =
∫ t
0(1− B(s))Fj(ds). We
already know that F˜j(t) =
∫ t
0 aj(s)Fj(ds), so the constant sum property of
(2.4) and hence also (2.1) follow. The property (5.4) and so (5.1) can be
obtained in a similar manner. This establishes (6.1).
From the equalities F˜j(t) =
∫ t
0 P(C ≥ s | T = s,D = j)Fj(ds) and
F˜0(t) =
∫ t
0 P(T > s | C = s)G(ds) which hold for all t ∈ J , the properties of
(6.2) and (6.3) are seen to be equivalent.
The equivalence between (6.1) and (6.2) shows that the property intro-
duced by Williams & Lagakos (1977) is equivalent to having both the iden-
tifiability and the censoring identifiability property. The property of (6.3)
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can be considered pointwise independence between (T,D) and C and, as is
evident from the proof of Proposition 6, it also implies P(T > t, C > t) =
P(T > t) P(C > t) for all t ≥ 0. For this reason, we refer to the properties in
Proposition 6 collectively as the property of pointwise independence. It does
not imply independence of (T,D) and C, however.
Independence of (T,D) and C is here referred to as full independence.
This assumption is made by many authors, and is, for instance, used in
Kaplan & Meier (1958). In Lagakos (1979), the property is described as
strictly stronger than the non-prognostic censoring property from Proposi-
tion 3. The next result shows that this is the case only because full indepen-
dence includes a further property of representativity of the given censoring
time. This property is that
P(C ≤ t | T˜ = s, D˜ = j) = P(C ≤ t | C ≥ s) (5)
holds for any t ≥ 0 and F˜j-almost all s ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d. We will refer to
this as the censoring representativity property as it is a counterpart to (3.2).
An argument similar to the one used in Proposition 4 shows that censoring
representativity implies censoring identifiability but that the two properties
are not equivalent. The following result now applies.
Proposition 7. Full independence, C ⊥ (T,D), holds if and only if both the
representativity property and the censoring representativity property hold.
Proof. It is evident that full independence implies (3.4). Similarly, P(C ≤
t | T˜ = s, D˜ = j) = P(C ≤ t | C ≥ s, T = s,D = j) = P(C ≤ t | C ≥ s) for
any t ≥ 0 and H˜j-almost all s ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d under the independence
assumption.
Assume instead that the properties of Proposition 3 and (5) hold. By
equation (12) of the appendix, (5.4) and so, by Proposition 5, also (5.1). Now
(5) states that P(C > t | T˜ = s, D˜ = j) = Pts−(1− Hˇ0(du)). This is exactly
the conditional distribution of the independent censoring time constructed
in the proof of Proposition 3. Since we are assuming that the properties of
Proposition 3 hold, the same calculations lead to the independence of C and
(T,D).
4 Examples
4.1 A technical setting
This technical example serves to illustrate the differences between the iden-
tifiability and representativity properties.
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Consider the probability space (Ω,F ,P) with Ω = [0, 1]2 = {(t, c) ∈
R
2 | 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1}, F the Borel σ-algebra, and P the uniform
distribution such that P([s, t]× [u, v]) = (t− s)(v−u) for s ≤ t, u ≤ v, all in
[0, 1]. The random variables given by T1(t, c) = t and C1(t, c) = c are then
independent. We further define the random variables
T2(t, c) =


(1− c) if 1
2
≤ t ≤ 1, 0 ≤ c < 1
2
t otherwise
C2(t, c) =


(1− t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
2
, 1
2
≤ c ≤ 1
c otherwise
,
and C3(t, c) = c1(c < t) + 1(c ≥ t). A direct calculation reveals that the
distributions of T1, T2, C1, C2 are all uniform on [0, 1].
If we define T˜ (t, c) = t ∧ c and D˜(t, c) = 1(t ≤ c), then T˜ = Ti ∧ Cj and
D˜ = 1(Ti ≤ Cj) for any choice of i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. That is, any
combination of the event and censoring times defined above yields the same
observable exit time and exit type.
Note that the representativity property holds for T1 by virtue of (3.4)
because T1 is independent of C1 and T˜ = T1∧C1 and so by Proposition 4, the
identifiability property also holds for T1. Thus, the identifiability property
also holds for T2 since, for instance, the property of identity of forces of
mortality is inherited from T1 as T1 and T2 have the same distribution. A
calculation reveals that for F˜0-almost all s ∈ [0,
1
2
) we have P(T2 ≤ 1−s | T˜ =
s, D˜ = 0) = 1 and P(T2 ≤ 1 − s | T2 > s) = 1 − s/(1 − s) such that
non-prognostic censoring and thereby representativity cannot hold for T2.
Similarly, censoring representativity holds for C1, but cannot hold for C2.
Since, for t ∈ [0, t), P(C3 ≤ t) = P(T˜ ≤ t, D˜ = 0) = F˜0(t), the cumulative
hazard associated with the distribution of C3 is
∫ t
0(1 − F˜0(s))
−1F˜0(ds) <∫ t
0(1 − F˜0(s) − F˜1(s))
−1F˜0(ds) =
∫ t
0 S˜(s)
−1F˜0(ds) = H˜0(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1)
such that censoring identifiability cannot hold for C3.
Figure 1 illustrates the definition of Ti and Cj as well as the observed
exit time T˜ as a heat map. Note how, for any combination of Ti and Cj,
the minimum of their respective graphs correspond to the graph of T˜ . The
assumptions met for the various choices of Ti and Cj to produce (T˜ , D˜) are
summarized by Table 1.
The primary idea behind these examples is that with basis in independent
T1 and C1, we can alter the unobserved parts of the underlying event and
censoring time without altering the observed (T˜ , D˜). If the event time is left
unaltered but the unobserved part of the censoring time is altered arbitrar-
ily, the representativity property is retained. If the marginal distribution is
retained as is the case for T2 and C2, the identifiability property is retained.
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1
Figure 1: Illustration of the definitions of the random variables of the techni-
cal example. Here, white is 0, black is 1, and gray is in between with darker
meaning closer to 1.
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Table 1: Assumptions met for various combinations of Ti and Cj.
Assumption (T1, C1) (T1, C2) (T1, C3) (T2, C1) (T2, C2) (T2, C3)
Identifiability X X X X X X
Representativity X X X
Cens. identifiability X X X X
Cens. representativity X X
Pointwise independence X X X X
Full independence X
4.2 A practical setting
As an illustration of a practical setting, we can consider the following ex-
ample of a register-based study. Suppose we are interested in studying the
cumulative incidences of different causes of death in a certain population. In
this case, we can let (T,D) denote the pair of time of death and cause of
death for a randomly picked member of the population. Imagine that we have
information on age and cause of death of population members except in the
case of emigration from the population. In other words, we have information
on T˜ ≤ T , which equals T if the time of death is observed and is the time of
emigration otherwise, and D˜ = D1(T˜ = T ), which is the cause of death if the
time of death is observed and 0, denoting emigration, otherwise. As can be
seen from Proposition 13 of the appendix, data on the observed pair (T˜ , D˜)
alone does not allow us to refute the idea that (T˜ , D˜) is produced by (T,D)
and a time to emigration C that are independent, C ⊥ (T,D). However, in
this case, common sense tells us that emigration cannot happen after death
so the time to emigration C can never be independent of (T,D). Instead,
one should rather define C =∞ when D˜ 6= 0 or, as in Section 2, simply not
trouble oneself with defining a time to emigration for all individuals.
Suppose now we are interested in estimating the cumulative incidence
proportion Fj(t) for various time points t ∈ J for the different causes of death
j = 1, . . . , d. In the end, the problem of defining a time to emigration has
no bearing on the validity of the Aalen–Johansen estimator as an estimate
of Fj(t). We instead require the identifiability property relating (T,D) to
(T˜ , D˜) directly as laid out in Proposition 2. In terms of the identity of
forces of mortality property, this requirement has the interpretation that
the observable hazard of any of the causes of death as represented by H˜j
should equal the underlying hazard of the same cause as represented by Hj
on the relevant time interval. In terms of the status-independent observation
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property, the requirement has the interpretation that the status of survival
up to any time point and the status of death of a certain cause at the same
time point are equally likely to be observed, that is, the probability of not
emigrating before that time point given the status does not depend on the
status.
If we are instead interested in using the Aalen–Johansen estimator for
prognosis, we need a stronger assumption. Suppose we are looking at pop-
ulation members that are alive and have not emigrated at time point s and
we are interested in estimating the probabilities of dying of the different
causes before time t > s. In other words, we are interested in estimating
P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s). Under the identifiability assumption, a valid es-
timate of P(T ≤ t, D = j | T > s) = (Fj(t) − Fj(s))/S(s) can be obtained
based on the Aalen–Johansen and related Kaplan–Meier estimator. In order
for this estimate to be a valid estimate of P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s) as well, an
assumption of the non-prognostic observation property from Proposition 3 is
needed. That is, we require the stronger representativity property to hold.
By the equivalence to non-prognostic censoring, this entails that population
members emigrating at time s have the same probabilities of dying of certain
causes as members that are alive at time s.
The representativity assumption also implies the existence of a censoring
time C independent of (T,D) which corresponds to the time to emigration
for individuals who emigrate. It may be useful to think in terms of such a C,
but its value for individuals who are not observed to be emigrating should
not, at least without further assumptions, be confused with a counterfactual
emigration time that would have been observed if death had not occurred
beforehand. In fact, the censoring time C may not have any relevant inter-
pretation for individuals who are observed to die.
In register-based studies, censoring at end of follow up may be much more
prominent than, for instance, censoring by emigration from the population.
End of follow-up is an example of a censoring time that may defined explicitly
without consideration of the underlying (T,D). This extra piece of informa-
tion can be used to judge whether censoring identifiability and censoring
representativity are appropriate, but these properties do not help us in judg-
ing the validity of the representativity or identifiability properties related
to (T,D) and thus the validity of the Aalen–Johansen and Kaplan–Meier
estimators.
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5 Discussion
When no given, underlying censoring time is considered, the assumptions
that we have studied that ensure consistency of the Kaplan–Meier and Aalen–
Johansen estimators fall in two categories: an identifiability assumption and
a representativity assumption. Although the properties within one cate-
gory are all equivalent, they are quite different in their interpretations and
hence some may be easier to communicate to a clinical researcher than oth-
ers. Which interpretation is most suitable is a matter of preference but it
seems to us that the properties of status-independent observation and non-
prognostic observation are much easier to interpret and potentially refute
than, for example, the corresponding martingale properties.
The appropriateness of either assumption cannot be assessed based on
information on the exit time and exit type alone as is seen from Proposi-
tion 13 of the appendix, which ensures the existence of an event time and
type that realize the observed exit time and exit type and at the same time
satisfy the representativity assumption. This is in a similar vein to the result
by Molenberghs et al. (2008) that one cannot distinguish between missing-
at-random and missing-not-at-random models based on only the observed
data. Consequently, any information used to the assess the validity of the
identifiability or representativity assumption must come from an external
source.
Other properties than the ones treated in this paper have been considered
in the literature. Ebrahimi et al. (2003) considered a certain property and
proceeded to argue its equivalence to the constant-sum property. Jacobsen
(1989) considered three nested properties in a setting where the observed
censoring times need not be independent and identically distributed, see his
Proposition 3.4.
It appears that these three properties all translate into equivalents of the
representativity property in our setting.
Our focus has been on marginal distributions, but in regression analysis
in a survival analysis context, a similar question of necessary assumptions
on the censoring mechanism is highly relevant. Seemingly, versions of the
assumptions studied here in the conditional distribution given covariates of
a regression model are useful in this respect.
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Appendix 1
Technical results
Consider the matrix H defined in (1). We then have the following character-
ization of the product integral P(I+ dH).
Lemma 8. Consider a (d + 1) × (d + 1) matrix-valued function given by
B(s, t) = {βi,j(s, t)} for s, t ≥ 0 which is right continuous with left limits
in both variables. Then, for given s ≥ 0, B(s, t) = Pts(I + H(du)) for all
t ∈ [s,∞) ∩ {t : S(t) > 0} if and only if
β1,j+1(s, t) =
∫ t
s
β1,1(s, u−)dHj(u)
for j = 1, . . . , d, β1,1(s, t) = 1−
∑d
j=1 β1,j+1(s, t), and βi,j(s, t) = 1(i = j) for
i = 2, . . . , d+ 1 for all t ∈ [s,∞) ∩ {t : S(t) > 0}.
Proof. This is a special case of Theorem 5 of Gill & Johansen (1990), which
establishes that B(s, t) = Pts(I+H(du)) if and only if the forward equation
B(s, t) − I =
∫ t
s B(s, u−)H(du) for all t ∈ [s,∞) ∩ {t : S(t) > 0} holds.
The only solutions to the equations βi,1(s, t) = −
∫ t
s βi,1(s, u−)H(du) for all
t ∈ [s,∞) ∩ {t : S(t) > 0} for i = 2, . . . , d + 1 implied by the forward
equation, are βi,1(s, t) = 0, see for instance Theorem 10 of Gill & Johansen
(1990). This, in turn, implies that βi,j(s, t) = 1(i = j) for i = 2, . . . , d + 1
for B to be a solution to the forward equation.
In the following, we give some useful identities in the setup of Section 3
where event time T , event type D, and censoring time C are all given and
we observe T˜ = T ∧C and D˜ = D1(T ≤ C). The identities not involving the
C may, however, also be used in the setting of Section 2 where a censoring
time C is not explicitly given.
Lemma 9. The equalities
P(T˜ < t | T ≥ t) = B(t) +
∫ t−
0
S˜(s−)
S(s)
(H˜ −H)(ds) (6)
and
P(T ≤ t | C ≥ t) =
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
1
K(s−)
F˜j(ds) +
∫ t−
0
Sˇ(s)
K(s)
(Hˇ0 −H0)(ds) (7)
hold for all t ∈ J .
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Proof. Since the product integral structures S(t)/S(s) = Pts(1 − H(du))
and S˜(t)/S˜(s) = Pts(1 − (H˜0 + H˜)(du)) hold, the equality S(t) − S˜(t) =∫ t
0 S(t)S(s)
−1S˜(s−)(H˜0 + H˜−H)(ds) holds according to the Duhamel equa-
tion, see Theorem 6 of Gill & Johansen (1990). Note that S(t−)− S˜(t−) =
P(T˜ < t, T ≥ t) and recall thatB(t) =
∫ t−
0 S(s)
−1F˜0(ds) =
∫ t−
0 S˜(s−)S(s)
−1H˜0(ds)
to obtain the equality (6).
A similar argument leads to P(T ≤ t | C ≥ t) =
∑d
j=1 ∆Fj(s)/K(t−) +∑d
j=1
∫ t−
0 K(s)
−1F˜j(ds) +
∫ t−
0 S˜(s−)K(s)
−1(H˜0 − H0)(ds). The equality (7)
now follows by realizing that
∫ t−
0 Sˇ(s)K(s)
−1Hˇ0(ds) =
∫ t−
0 S˜(s−)K(s)
−1H˜0(ds)
and
∫ t−
0 (S˜(s−) − Sˇ(s))K(s)
−1H0(ds) =
∑d
j=1
∑
s<t ∆F˜j(s)∆H0(s)/K(s) =∑d
j=1
∫ t−
0 (K(s−)
−1 −K(s)−1)F˜j(ds).
Lemma 10. The equalities
B(t) = P(T˜ < t | T ≥ t) +
1
S(t−)
d∑
j=1
∫ t−
0
(1− aj(s)− B(s))Fj(ds) (8)
and
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
1
K(u−)
F˜j(du) = P (T ≤ t | C ≥ t)
+
1
K(t−)
∫ t−
0
(
1− P(T˜ = s, D˜ = 0 | C = s) (9)
−
d∑
j=1
∫ s
0
1
K(u−)
F˜j(du)
)
G(ds)
hold for all t ∈ J .
Proof. We know that
∑d
j=1 Fj(t−) = 1 − S(t−) and similarly that S˜(t−) +∑d
j=0 F˜j(t−) = 1. Since F˜j(s) =
∫ s
0 aj(u)Fj(du), we have 1−
∑d
j=1
∫ t−
0 aj(s)Fj(ds) =
S˜(t−) + F˜0(t−). Recall that B(s) =
∫ s−
0 S(u)
−1F˜0(du). A change in the or-
der of integration reveals that F˜0(t−) −
∑d
j=1
∫ t−
0 B(s)Fj(ds) =
∫ t−
0 P(T ≥
t | T > u)F˜0(du) = S(t−)B(t), where the definition of B is used once more.
Put together, this establishes that the equality
d∑
j=1
∫ t−
0
(1− aj(s)− B(s))Fj(ds) = S˜(t−)− S(t−) + S(t−)B(t)
holds for all t ∈ J . Now the desired result follows since P(T˜ < t | T ≥ t) =
(S(t−)−S˜(t−))/S(t−). As for the second equality, similar arguments lead to∑d
j=1
∫ t−
0 K(u−)
−1F˜j(du) = (1− S˜(t−)K(t−)
−1) +K(t−)−1
∫ t−
0 (1− P(T˜ =
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s, D˜ = 0 | C = s) −
∑d
j=1
∫ s
0 K(u−)
−1F˜j(du))G(ds) and (9) then follows
since P(T ≤ t | C ≥ t) = (1 − Sˇ(t)K(t−)−1) = (1 − S˜(t−)K(t−)−1) +∑d
j=1 ∆F˜j(t)/K(t−).
Lemma 11. The equality
P(T ≤ t, D = j | T > s)− P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s)
=
∫ t
s
Fj(t | u)
S˜(u−)
S˜(s)
(H˜ −H)(du) +
∫ t
s
S˜(u−)
S˜(s)
(Hj − H˜j)(du)
+
1
S˜(s)
∫ t
s
(
Fj(t | u)− P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ = u, D˜ = 0)
)
F˜0(du)
(10)
holds for all t ≥ 0 and s ∈ J with s < t.
Proof. As a preliminary step, we have P(T ≤ t, D = j |T˜ > s)−P(T˜ ≤ t, D˜ =
j | T > s) = P(T ≤ t, D = j, T˜ ≤ t, D˜ = 0 | T˜ > s) = P(T˜ > s)−1
∫ t
s P(T ≤
t, D = j | T˜ = u, D˜ = 0)F˜0(du). On the other hand, an application of the
Duhamel equation in d + 2 dimensions, or a direct calculation, reveals that
P(T ≤ t, D = j | T > s)−P(T˜ ≤ t, D˜ = j | T˜ > s) =
∫ t
s P(T ≤ t, D = j | T >
u)S˜(u−)S˜(s)−1(H˜0 + H˜−H)(du)+
∫ t
s S˜(u−)S˜(s)
−1(Hj − H˜j)(du). Subtract
the first expression from the second expression to obtain (10).
Lemma 12. The equalities
∫ t
0
(
Fj(t | s)− P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ = s, D˜ = 0)
)
F˜0(ds)
=
∫ t
0
(aj(s) +B(s)− 1)Fj(ds)
(11)
and
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
(
P(C ≤ t | C ≥ s)− P(C ≤ t | T˜ = s, D˜ = j)
)
F˜j(ds)
=
∫ t
0
(
P(T˜ = s, D˜ = 0 | C = s) +
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
1
K(u−)
F˜j(du)− 1
)
G(ds)
(12)
hold for all t ∈ J for alle j = 1, . . . , d.
Proof. A change in the order of integration shows that
∫ t
0 B(u)Fj(du) =∫ t
0 Fj(t | s)F˜0(ds). Split up Fj(t) = F˜j(t) +
∫ t
0 P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ = s, D˜ =
0)F˜0(ds), where we have F˜j(t) =
∫ t
0 aj(s)dFj(s), and put together to obtain
(11). The argument for (12) is similar.
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Appendix 2
Convergence of the Aalen–Johansen estimator
For an i.i.d. sample (T˜1, D˜1), . . . , (T˜n, D˜n) of (T˜ , D˜), we let Hˆj,n denote the
Nelson–Aalen estimator for Hj and Hˆn =
∑d
j=1 Hˆj,n. If we define the (d +
1)× (d+ 1) matrix
Hˆn(t) =


−Hˆn(t) Hˆ1,n(t) · · · Hˆd,n(t)
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0


then the Aalen–Johansen estimator is defined as
Pˆn(t) =
t
R
0
(I+ Hˆn(ds)). (13)
By arguments similar to Section 4.2 of Gill & Johansen (1990), we see that
sups∈[0,t] |Hˆj,n(s)− H˜j(s)| → 0 almost surely for n→ ∞ for all j and t ∈ J
and thus also sups∈[0,t] ‖Hˆn(s) − H˜(s)‖ → 0 almost surely for n → ∞ for
all t ∈ J . By continuity of the product integral (Gill & Johansen, 1990) we
conclude that
sup
s∈[0,t]
‖Pˆn(s)−
s
R
0
(I+ H˜(du))‖ → 0 (14)
almost surely as n→∞ for all t ∈ J .
The Kaplan–Meier estimator for the all-cause survival function S is de-
fined as
Sˆn(t) =
t
R
0
(1− Hˆn(ds)) (15)
which is just entry (1, 1) of Pˆn(t).
Appendix 3
Constructing latent times
Let us consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) on which random variables
T˜ : Ω → (0,∞) and D˜ : Ω → {0, . . . , d} are defined. We now want to
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extend the probability space in order to define a random variable C that
satisfies C ≥ T˜ when D˜ 6= 0 and C = T˜ when D˜ = 0 and follows a certain
conditional distribution given (T˜ , D˜). The desired conditional cumulative
distribution function is given by FC|T˜ ,D˜(c | t˜, d˜) = 1(t˜ ≤ c)1(d˜ = 0) + (1 −
Pct˜−(1− Hˇ0(du)))1(t˜ ≤ c)1(d˜ 6= 0) where Hˇ0 is defined in (3) solely based on
the distribution of (T˜ , D˜). For given t˜ and d˜, the function c 7→ FC|T˜ ,D˜(c | t˜, d˜)
is right-continuous and increasing. For a right-continuous and increasing
function f : R → R, the inversion, as defined in for instance Section II.2a
of Asmussen & Glynn (2007), given by f←(u) = inf{x : f(x) ≥ u} ∈ R ∪
{−∞,∞} is a useful concept. Using right continuity and that f is increasing,
the conclusion that u ≤ f(x) if and only if f←(u) ≤ x can be reached.
Extend the sample space to Ω′ = Ω × [0, 1] and the σ-algebra to F ′ =
F × B([0, 1]), where B is the Borel σ-algebra, and the probability measure
by P′(A × (u, v]) = P(A)(v − u). By these extensions, the random variable
U defined on the probability space (Ω′,F ′,P′) and given by U(ω′) = u for
ω′ = (ω, u) ∈ Ω′ follows a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and is independent of
(T˜ , D˜). The random variable defined by C(ω′) = F←
C|T˜ ,D˜
(u | T˜ (ω), D˜(ω)) for
ω′ = (ω, u), where u 7→ F←
C|T˜ ,D˜
(u | t˜, d˜) is the inversion of c 7→ FC|T˜ ,D˜(c | t˜, d˜),
now fulfills C(ω′) ≥ T˜ (ω) when D˜(ω) 6= 0 and C(ω′) = T˜ (ω) when D˜(ω) = 0
and has the desired conditional distribution. Renaming P′ to P, we note
that, for t ≤ s,
P(T˜ ≤ t, D˜ = j, C > s) =
∫ t
0
P(C > s | T˜ = u, D˜ = j)F˜j(du)
=
∫ t
0
s
R
u−
(1− Hˇ0(du))F˜j(du)
=
s
R
0
(1− Hˇ0(du))
∫ t
0
u−
R
0
(1− H˜(dv))dH˜j(u),
(16)
where the last equation uses S˜(s) = Ps0(1 − Hˇ0(du))Ps0(1 − H˜(du)) and
H˜j(s) =
∫ s
0 S˜(u−)
−1F˜j(du). Since Ps0(1−H˜(du))+∑dj=1 ∫ s0 Pu−0 (1−H˜(dv))H˜j(du) =
1, these equalities can also be used to establish that
P(C > s) = S˜(s) +
d∑
j=1
P(T˜ ≤ s, D˜ = j, C > s)
=
s
R
0
(1− Hˇ0(du)).
(17)
This reveals that the constructed C is proper when and only when Ps0(1 −
Hˇ0(du))→ 0 for s→∞.
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In a setting identical to above, we now want to construct (T,D) such
that (T,D) = (T˜ , D˜) when D˜ 6= 0 and T > T˜ when D˜ = 0 and such that
(T,D) has a certain conditional distribution given (T˜ , D˜). Here, the desired
conditional cumulative distribution function is given by FT,D|T˜ ,D˜(t, j | t˜, d˜) =
1(t˜ ≤ t)1(0 < d˜ ≤ j) +
∑j
k=1
∫ t
t˜ Ps−t˜ (1 − H˜(du))H˜k(du)1(d˜ = 0)1(t˜ ≤ t).
This can be achieved in a manner similar to above. A two step procedure is
to construct D according to the conditional cumulative distribution function
given by FD|T˜ ,D˜(j | t˜, d˜) = FT,D|T˜ ,D˜(∞, j | t˜, d˜)(FT,D|T˜ ,D˜(∞, d | t˜, d˜))
−1 and then
to construct T according to the conditional cumulative distribution function
given by
FT |D,T˜ ,D˜(t | j, t˜, d˜) =
FT,D|T˜ ,D˜(t, j | t˜, d˜)− FT,D|T˜ ,D˜(t, j − 1 | t˜, d˜)
FD|T˜ ,D˜(j | t˜, d˜)− FD|T˜ ,D˜(j − 1 | t˜, d˜)
where division by 0 can be taken to produce 0. The so constructed pair
(T,D) satisfies in particular P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ = s, D˜ = 0) =
∫ t
s Pu−s (1 −
H˜(dv))H˜j(du) for t ≥ t˜ and s ∈ J for j = 1, . . . , d and so also
P(T ≤ t, D = j) = F˜j(t) +
∫ t
0
P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ = s, D˜ = 0)F˜0(ds)
=
∫ t
0
S˜(u−)H˜j(du) +
∫ t
0
∫ t
s
u−
R
s
(1− H˜(dv))H˜j(du)F˜0(ds)
=
∫ t
0
(
S˜(u−) +
∫ u−
0
u−
R
s
(1− H˜(dv))F˜0(ds)
)
H˜j(du)
=
∫ t
0
u−
R
0
(1− H˜(dv))
( u−
R
0
(1− Hˇ0(dv)) +
∫ u−
0
s−
R
0
(1− Hˇ0(dv))Hˇ0(ds)
)
H˜j(du)
=
∫ t
0
u−
R
0
(1− H˜(dv))H˜j(du).
These constructions lead to the following proposition, which has similar-
ities to Theorem 2 of Tsiatis (1975).
Proposition 13. Given positive random variable T˜ and random variable D˜
with values in {0, . . . , d}, positive random variables T and C and random
variable D with values in {1, . . . , d} exist such that T˜ = T ∧C, D˜ = D1(T ≤
C) and such that (T,D) is independent of C.
Proof. Construct C, T and D as described above. The distribution of C
is given by P(C > t) = Pt0(1 − Hˇ0(ds)) and the distribution of (T,D) is
given by P(T ≤ t, D = j) =
∫ t
0 Ps−0 (1 − H˜(du))H˜j(ds). Equation (16)
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reveals that, for t ≤ s, P(T ≤ t, D = j, C > s) = P(T˜ ≤ t, D˜ = j, C >
s) = P(C > s) P(T ≤ t, D = j). By construction we have, for t > s,
P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ = s, D˜ = 0) = P(T ≤ t, D = j | T > s). According to
Proposition 3, this implies P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s) = P(T ≤ t, D = j |T > s)
for all t ≥ 0 and s ∈ J . Using this and (4), we have, for t > s with s ∈ J ,
P(T ∈ (s, t], D = j, C > s) = P(T ≤ t, D = j | T˜ > s) P(T˜ > s)
=
∫ t
s
u−
R
s
(1− H˜(dv))H˜j(du)
s
R
0
(1− H˜(du))
s
R
0
(1− Hˇ0(du))
=
∫ t
s
u−
R
0
(1− H˜(dv))H˜j(du)
s
R
0
(1− Hˇ0(du))
= P(T ∈ (s, t], D = j) P(C > s).
Both sides are 0 if s ∈ (0,∞)\J . We have thereby established that P(T ≤
t, D = j, C > s) = P(T ≤ t, D = j) P(C > s) for all t, s ≥ 0 and j = 1, . . . , d,
and so (T,D) and C are independent.
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